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1. Introduction 
This study provides a forward-looking simulation analysis of economy-wide and distributional 
implications associated with alternative pathways for the development of the electricity sector 
in Ghana and Kenya. It is part of a wider research project that seeks to identify the binding 
constraints to economically viable investments in renewable energy and to analyse the political 
feasibility of a transition to a sustainable low carbon energy path in the two countries.  
From an economic perspective, significant shifts in the power mix of an economy as well as 
policy measures to induce or support such shifts are bound to affect the structure of domestic 
prices across the whole economy with repercussions for the growth prospects of different 
production sectors and for the real income growth paths of different socio-economics groups. 
Understanding these economy-wide repercussions is crucial for a study concerned with the 
obstacles to - and political feasibility of - adopting a low-carbon growth strategy.  The analysis 
requires the adoption of a multi-sectoral general equilibrium approach that allows to capture 
the input-output linkages between the electricity sector and the rest of the economy as well as 
the linkages between production activity, household income and expenditure and government 
policy.  
Thus, the present study develops purpose-built dynamic computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models for Ghana and Kenya with a detailed country-specific representation of the 
power sector to simulate the prospective medium-run growth and distributional implications 
associated with a shift towards a higher share of renewables in the power mix up to 2025. 
The following section explains the methodological approach and describes the key features of 
the CGE models in a non-technical manner. Each model is calibrated to a social accounting 
matrix (SAM) which reflects the observed input-output structure of production, the commodity 
composition of demand and the pattern of income distribution for the country at a disaggregated 
level at the start of the simulation horizon. Section 3 spells out the data sources for the 
construction of the social accounting matrices and outlines the model calibration process. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the results of the dynamic simulation analysis for Kenya and Ghana 
respectively. In each case, we first develop a stylised baseline scenario that simulates the 
evolution of the economy under current power sector expansion plans up to 2025 and then 
contrast these baselines with alternative lower carbon energy scenarios. Furthermore, the 
sensitivity of results to alternative projections for world market fossil fuel prices is explored. 
Section 6 draws conclusions. 
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2. The Analytic Framework 
2.1. Rationale for the Adoption of a CGE Approach 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models – aka applied general equilibrium models – are 
widely used tools in energy and climate mitigation policy analysis. Applications range from 
short-run impact assessments of shocks to the energy system for particular countries to global 
long-run energy system scenario studies with a time horizon of multiple decades.1 
The prime appeal of – and need for - adopting a general equilibrium approach to energy policy 
and energy-related environmental policy analysis arises from the fact that energy is an input to 
virtually every economic activity. Hence, changes in the energy sector ‘will ripple through 
multiple markets, with far larger consequences than energy’s small share of national income 
might suggest’ (Sue Wing, 2009). The unique advantage of the CGE approach over partial 
equilibrium approaches is its ability to incorporate these ‘ripple effects’ in a systematic manner. 
In contrast to partial equilibrium approaches, CGE models consider all sectors in an economy 
simultaneously and take consistent account of economy-wide resource constraints, 
intersectoral intermediate input-output linkages and interactions between markets for goods 
and services on the one hand and primary factor markets including labour markets on the other. 
CGE models simulate the full circular flow of income in an economy from (i) income 
generation through productive activity, to (ii) the primary distribution of that income to 
workers, owners of productive capital, and recipients of the proceeds from land and other 
natural resource endowments, to (iii) the redistribution of that income through taxes and 
transfers, and to (iv) the use of that income for consumption and investment (Pueyo et al, 2015). 
 
2.2. Specification of the Dynamic CGE Models for Kenya and Ghana 
In terms of theoretical pedigree, the CGE models for Kenya and Ghana employed in this study 
can be characterized as modified dynamic extensions of standard comparative-static single-
country CGE models for developing countries in the tradition of Dervis, de Melo and Robinson 
                                                 
1 For a survey of energy-focused CGE studies up to the mid-1990s see Bhattacharyya (1996). For more recent 
overviews, see Sue Wing (2009) and Kemfert and Truong (2009). For a concise recent survey of the small number 
of CGE studies concerned with a low-carbon energy transition in developing countries see Pueyo et al (2015: 52-
59). 
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(1982), Robinson et al (1999) and Lofgren et al (2002). Models belonging to this class have 
been widely used in applied development policy research. Apart from the incorporation of 
capital accumulation, population growth, labor force growth and technical progress,2 the main 
difference to the standard model is a more sophisticated specification of the electricity sector 
as detailed below. 
 
2.2.1. Domestic Production and Input Demand 
Domestic producers in the model are price takers in output and input markets and maximize 
intra-temporal profits subject to technology constraints. The technologies for the 
transformation of inputs into real outputs are described by sectoral constant-returns-to scale 
production functions. In line with common practice in energy-focused top-down CGE models,3 
technology specifications belonging to the generic class of KLEM (Capital (K), Labour, 
Energy, Materials) production functions are employed to capture substitution possibilities 
among energy and-non-energy inputs and among different energy sources. In technical terms, 
the sectoral KLEM production functions take the form of nested multi-level functions with a 
(positive or zero) constant elasticity of substitution (CES) among inputs grouped together 
within the same nest. Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the substitution hierarchy 
between different inputs in production in the model. 
In each sector, the production of a given output quantity requires non-energy inputs and a 
composite value-added/energy composite in fixed proportions. The value added/energy 
composite requires energy and primary factors (i.e. skilled and unskilled labour, capital, land 
and natural resources) in variable proportions. Thus, when the composite price index of energy 
rises relative to primary factor prices, energy inputs are replaced to some extent by additional 
inputs of primary factors. In other words, the model generates a shift towards less energy-
intensive modes of production in response to an increase in energy prices. Required energy 
inputs are composed of electricity purchases from the electricity sector in the model and direct 
use of fossil fuels. The model allows substitution of these primary fossil energy carriers for 
electricity in sectors where the input-output matrices of the GTAP database record intermediate 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Arndt, Robinson and Willenbockel (2011) and Robinson, Willenbockel and Strzepek (2012) for earlier 
recursive-dynamic extensions of the standard model. 
3 See e.g. Böhringer and Löschel (2004), Böhringer, Löschel and Rutherford (2009), Willenbockel and Hoa 
(2011). For further reference to the literature on energy-focused top-down CGE models, see again Pueyo et al 
(2015: Chapter 6). 
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purchases of fossil fuels. At the bottom of the input substitution hierarchy, the sectoral 
production functions allow for imperfect substitutability between coal, refined oil and natural 
gas.  
 
 
Figure 1: Production Function Nesting Structure 
 
2.2.2. Electricity Supply 
In standard energy-focused top-down CGE models, electricity generation and distribution is 
typically treated as a single production activity. In these models a transition towards a higher 
share of hydro, solar or wind in the power mix is represented in a highly stylized abstract form 
as a substitution of fossil fuel inputs by physical capital under the assumption of a continuous 
space of available technologies. The lack of explicit detail with regard to the characterization 
of current and future technology options entails the danger that in the case of simulation 
scenarios involving large departures from the initial benchmark equilibrium may violate 
fundamental physical restrictions such as the conservation of matter and energy (Böhringer and 
Rutherford, 2008) or exceed other technical feasibility limits (McFarland, Reilly and Herzog, 
2004; Hourcade et al, 2006; Bibas and Mejean, 2012). Moreover, the lack of technological 
explicitness limits the ability of top-down models to incorporate detailed information on cost 
differentials among alternative energy technologies from engineering cost studies and to 
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simulate technology-specific policy measures in a fully persuasive manner (Hourcade et al, 
2006). In response to these limitations of conventional top-down CGE models, various 
approaches to the incorporation of detailed ‘bottom up’ information on energy technology 
options into a CGE modelling framework have emerged.4  
The present study adopts a similar hybrid top-down bottom-up approach by treating 
decomposing electricity generation according to power source and by treating electricity 
transmission / distribution as a separate activity. This approach enables us to incorporate extant 
information on levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) differentials by power source into the 
simulation analysis and to consider exogenous policy-driven changes in the power mix that are 
not necessarily driven by changes in relative market prices. The system-wide supply price of 
electricity in the models is effectively determined as weighted average of the activity-specific 
supply prices across the power activities. The operational aspects of the power sector 
decomposition are outlined in section 3 below. 
2.2.3. Primary Factor Supply  
The model distinguishes skilled and unskilled labour. The dynamic labour supply paths are 
exogenous and both types of labour are intersectorally mobile. The supply of agricultural land 
and natural resource endowments (forests, minerals, and in the case of Ghana crude oil and 
natural gas) is imperfectly elastic, i.e. the supply of these primary factors varies endogenously 
in response to changes in the corresponding factor price. The productive capital stock in each 
sector a evolves according to the dynamic accumulation equation  
K(a,t+1) = I(a,t) + (1 – δ(a))K(a,t),  
where K denotes the installed real capital stock, I(a,t) is real gross investment flowing to sector 
a in period t and δ is the rate of physical capital depreciation. Sectoral gross investment is a 
positive function of a sector’s rate of return to capital relative to the economy-wide average 
return to capital, i.e. the sectoral allocation of aggregate real investment is determined by return 
                                                 
4 Examples for the development and application of such hybrid top-down bottom-up models include inter alia 
McFarland, Reilly and Herzog (2004), Böhringer and Löschel (2006), Sue Wing (2008), Böhringer and Rutherford 
(2008, 2013), Sassi et al (2010), Boeters and Koornneef (2011), Lanz and Rausch (2011), Bibas and  Mejean 
(2012), Okagawa et al (2012) and Fortes et al (2013). 
 
10 
 
differentials. Once installed, capital is sector-specific (i.e. immobile across sectors) while new 
capital is intersectorally mobile.  
 
2.2.4. Final Domestic Demand 
Consumer behavior is derived from intra-temporal utility maximizing behavior subject to 
within-period budget constraints. Utility functions take the Stone-Geary form, yielding a 
Linear Expenditure System (LES) demand specification.  The commodity composition of 
investment and government demand is kept constant according to the observed shares in the 
benchmark SAM while the total volumes of government and investment demand grow in line 
with aggregate income and are determined by the macro closure rules detailed below. 
 
2.2.5. International Trade 
In all traded commodity groups, imports and goods of domestic origin are treated as imperfect 
substitutes in both final and intermediate demand. Agents’ optimizing behaviour entails that 
the expenditure-minimizing equilibrium ratio of imports to domestic goods in any traded 
commodity group varies endogenously with the corresponding relative price of imports to 
domestically produced output in that commodity group. 
On the supply side, the model takes account of product differentiation between exports to the 
rest of the world and production for the domestic market in all exporting sectors. The 
technologies for conversion of output into exports are described by sectoral constant-elasticity-
of- transformation (CET) functions. This entails that the profit-maximizing equilibrium ratio 
of exports to domestic goods in any exporting sector is determined by the price relation between 
export and home market sales. 
Both Kenya and Ghana are treated as small open economies – i.e. changes in their export supply 
and import demand quantity have no influence on the structure of world market prices. 
 
2.2.6. Equilibrium Conditions and Macro Closure 
The prices for goods, services and primary factors are flexible and adjust in order to satisfy the 
market clearing conditions for output and factor markets. Foreign savings and hence the current 
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account balance follow an exogenous time path. This time path is kept fixed across the 
simulation scenarios considered in subsequent sections in order to enable meaningful welfare 
comparisons across the scenarios. This external sector closure entails that the real exchange 
rate adjusts endogenous to maintain external balance-of-payments equilibrium. A standard 
balanced macroeconomic closure rule (Lofgren et al, 2002) is adopted, according to which the 
shares of government demand, investment demand and hence private household consumption 
demand in total absorption remain invariant. Under this macro closure, household and 
government saving rates adjust residually to establish the macroeconomic saving-investment 
balance. 
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3. Data Sources and Model Calibration 
3.1. The Social Accounting Matrices for Kenya and Ghana: Overview 
Each model is calibrated to a SAM which reflects the input-output structure of production, the 
commodity composition of demand and the pattern of income distribution for the country at a 
disaggregated level at the start of the simulation horizon. Starting point for the construction of 
the model-conformable SAMs are the input-output matrices for Kenya and Ghana contained in 
the GTAP database version 9 (Aguiar, Narayanan and McDougall, 2016). This data set 
provides a detailed and internally consistent representation the global economy-wide structure 
of production, demand and international trade at a regionally and sectorally disaggregated 
level. GTAP 9a – the latest available version of the database - combines detailed bilateral trade 
and protection data reflecting economic linkages among 140 world regions with individual 
regional input-output data, which account for intersectoral linkages among 57 production 
sectors for the benchmark year 2011.5 
The GTAP database treats electricity generation, transmission and distribution as a single 
aggregate activity and the data on household income and household consumer expenditure are 
for a single aggregate household. For the purposes of the present study, both the electricity 
activity and the household sector are disaggregated as detailed below. 
 
3.2. Disaggregation of the Electricity Sector 
The decomposition of the power activity for each country essentially involves (i) splitting the 
single electricity activity column vector of the original GTAP input-output matrix (which 
contains the annual input cost by input type for the benchmark year) into several new columns 
for the different electricity sub-sectors distinguished in the CGE model, and (ii) distributing 
                                                 
5 The raw data for the Ghana country bloc of the GTAP database include a SAM for 2005 constructed by 
Breisinger, Thurlow and Duncan (2007) and the raw data for Kenya in GTAP include a 2001 SAM developed at 
KIPPRA in collaboration with the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a predecessor of the latest 
available KIPPRA-IFPRI SAM for 2003 (Kiringai, Thurlow and Wanjala, 2006 and Kiringai et al, 2007). 
In the case of Kenya, the GTAP input-output data have been triangulated with information from unpublished 
supply-and-use tables (SUT) for 2009 kindly provided by Dr Bernadette Wanjala (KIPPRA). Following minor 
revisions in the course of this triangulation process, the SAM has been rebalanced using a variant of the cross-
entropy approach proposed by Robinson, Cattaneo and El-Said (2001). For Ghana, no recent SUT data are 
available. 
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the cost figures of the original aggregate electricity cost vectors horizontally across the new 
columns in line with available information about the cost composition in the electricity sub-
sectors and in such a way that the original cost totals by input type are preserved. This is a non-
trivial problem. The common procedure employed in the construction of databases for energy-
focused hybrid top-down bottom-up CGE models is to start with an informed initial estimate 
for the entries in the new sub-industry column vectors and then apply a numerical matrix 
balancing method to enforce the target sub-matrix totals.6  
Peters (2016) constructs a satellite database for GTAP9 which disaggregates the GTAP 
electricity activity for all regions in the database along these lines. However, the regional 
coverage of LCOE estimates used in the construction of the Peters database is incomplete, with 
country-specific estimates for Africa being notable by their virtual absence.7 In cases, where 
the discrepancies between the row totals implied by the initial guesses in the absence of 
country-specific data and the target GTAP row totals is large, the application of the mechanical 
matrix balancing algorithm can generate seriously misleading results. The case of Kenya – 
flagged up explicitly by Peters (2016:231, n12) as a problematic case – illustrates the point: In 
the benchmark year 2011 Kenya generates electricity primarily from hydro, thermal (i.e. fossil 
fuel) and geothermal sources8. Geothermal is not identified as a separate technology in the 
Peters database, but would in principle be covered one-to-one by the residual “Other” category 
in that data base. Yet, attributing the reported cost figures in this category to geothermal would 
lead to seriously misleading results.9  
Therefore, the decomposition of the electricity sectors for the present study uses additional 
country-specific data and information from other studies. For Kenya, the electricity activity is 
disaggregated into transmission and distribution (TD), hydro, geothermal, thermal and wind. 
First, the cost totals for the sub-activities are determined: The TD share is based on Peters 
(2016) while the total generation share is distributed across the four generation activities by 
combining the 2011 electricity generation data in GWh reported in Republic of Kenya (2014: 
                                                 
6 See Peters and Hertel (2016a,b) for a detailed discussion of comparison of existing matrix balancing algorithms 
used in this context and further references to the related technical literature. 
7 See Peters (2016: Appendix C). As Peters (2016:216) puts it, “(i)ncreasing the LCOE coverage is a major 
opportunity for subsequent versions”. 
8 See Table 5 below. 
99 E.g. the reported share of fossil fuel inputs in total cost for this category is more than 70 percent. 
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Table 33)10 with the LCOE cost differential estimates for Kenya (Table 1) reported in Pueyo 
et al (2016). Fossil fuel input are entirely allocated to the thermal electricity activity while 
initial estimates for the allocation of other inputs are informed by the cost shares for the 
different generation technologies in the Peters (2016) database and - for geothermal – on cost 
share data from Sue Wing (2008) and Lehr et al (2011).11 Finally, to establish full consistency 
of the cost entries with the GTAP cost totals by input type and the target electricity sub-activity 
column sums, a standard bi-proportional RAS matrix balancing algorithm is employed. 
The electricity sector decomposition for Ghana splits the sector into TD, hydro and thermal 
and follows the same procedural approach. The required physical data on power generation by 
technology for the benchmark year 2011 are drawn from EnCG (2016). 
The resulting synthetic cost vectors capture the salient stylized facts with regard to input 
intensities of the different electricity generation technologies, namely that hydro, geothermal 
and wind are very capital-intensive and have moderate intermediate input requirements, 
geothermal is particularly skill-intensive and fossil fuel costs are the dominant cost factor in 
thermal generation (and more so in high-fossil-price periods such as in the benchmark year 
2011). 
 
Table 1 Levelised Cost of Electricity by Technology and Country 
  Ghana Kenya 
Hydro 6.8 - 11.2 7.4 - 10.9 
Wind 12.6 - 19.5 7.7 - 10.3 
Geothermal Not applicable 4.7 - 7.5 
Solar PV 16.0 - 26.9 9.9 - 14.8 
   
Thermal - Oil 19.0 26.0 - 42.0 
Thermal - Gas 13.0 13.3 
Source: Pueyo et al (2016). 
 
  
                                                 
10 See Table 5 below. 
11 These estimates have been further triangulated with the cost shares employed in related other hybrid top-down 
bottom-up CGE studies including Capros et al (2013) and Proenca and St Aubyn (2013). 
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3.3. Disaggregation of the Household Accounts 
The household disaggregation for Ghana distinguishes five household groups - labelled H1 
(bottom quintile) to H5 (top quintile) - by household income quintile in the benchmark year. 
The available data sources do not support a consistent rural-urban split. Information on the 
distribution of factor income is drawn from the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS 6) 
(GSS, 2014: Section 10). To establish full consistency with the economy-wide functional 
household income distribution by factor type given by the GTAP database while preserving 
the GLSS factor income distribution by household quintile, a bi-proportional matrix balancing 
algorithm is used. In the benchmark year households in the top quintile receive 45.6 percent of 
total income while the share of the bottom quintile is 5.3 percent. For H1 to H4 the main income 
source is low-skilled employment (including imputed labour income from self-employment), 
whereas the dominant income source for H5 is skilled employment. Top quintile households 
also receive the largest shares of total capital and natural resource rent income. The 
decomposition of the aggregate household consumption vector by commodity group from the 
GTAP database uses household expenditure shares by quintile derived from GLSS. 
For Kenya, no recent representative household income and expenditure survey is available. 
The last survey is the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS) 2005/06. As the 
published KIHBS results provides insufficient detail on the income distribution by income 
type, the household sector decomposition for Ghana draws upon the household disaggregation 
generated by Kiringai et al (2007) for the KIPPRA-IFPRI SAM, which is based on an earlier 
survey for 1997 and distinguishes urban and rural households by expenditure decile. 
Employing such a dated source is obviously unsatisfactory. However, Gakuro and Mathenge 
(2012:Table 2) show that there is remarkably little change between the 1997 and the 2005/06 
expenditure distribution, except for a marked 5 percentage-point gain for the top urban decile 
primarily at the expense of the ninth and eighth decile and to a lesser extent at the expense of 
the bottom two deciles. Thus, across broader household aggregates the distribution is almost 
stable between 1997 and 2005/06, e.g. the share of the top 5 rural deciles remains constant at 
75 percent, while the share of the top 5 urban deciles rises modestly from 77 to 79 percent.12 
                                                 
12 An inspection of the corresponding KIHBS and 1997 data in World Bank (2008) and in the UNU-WIDER 
(2017) WIID database confirms this finding. It must be noted though that over this period the urban share of 
Kenya’s total population has risen from 18.9 to 21.7 percent and further to 24.0 percent in our benchmark year 
2011 according to World Bank data.  
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Correspondingly, the Kenya SAM and model uses a coarse household disaggregation with four 
household groups – labelled Rural Low, Rural High, Urban Low and Urban High – which 
represent respectively the bottom and top 50% rural and urban households in the benchmark 
year. In short, a more detailed household disaggregation is not supported by the available data 
at this point in time. 
 
3.4. SAM Dimensions 
The benchmark SAM for Kenya distinguishes 19 production activities (Table 1), 7 primary 
production factors including 3 sector-specific natural resource factors (forest, fish and mineral 
stocks) beside skilled and unskilled labour, capital, and agricultural land and 4 household 
categories. The Ghana SAM for the benchmark year contains 18 production activities (Table 
2), 8 primary factors including oil / gas resource stocks in addition to the same factors as in the 
Kenya SAM, and 5 household groups. Both SAMs contain 18 commodity groups (Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Other Mining, Beverages and Tobacco, Processed 
Food, Textiles and Clothing including Footwear and Leather Goods, Refined Petrol, Chemicals 
including Plastic and Rubber Goods, Other Light Manufacturing, Other Heavy Manufacturing, 
Electricity, Construction Services, Trade Services, Other Services). 
 
3.5. Model Calibration  
The numerical calibration process involves the determination of the initial model parameters 
in such a way that the equilibrium solution for the benchmark year exactly replicates the 
benchmark SAM. The selection of values for the sectoral factor elasticities of substitution, the 
elasticities of substitution between imports and domestically produced output by commodity 
group, and the target income elasticities of household demand is informed by available 
econometric evidence from secondary sources and uses estimates provided by the GTAP 
behavioral parameter database (Hertel and van der Mensbrugghe, 2016). The region-specific 
income elasticity estimates reported in that source for a representative single aggregated 
household are further differentiated across the lower and higher income households in the 
model, e.g. for necessary goods such as food products with an observed higher budget share in 
low-income households, the initial elasticities are raised vis-à-vis the central GTAP values and 
vice versa for high-income households and ‘luxury’ goods. 
17 
 
Given the selection of these free parameters, the various share parameters of the models – 
including the effective initial direct and indirect model tax rates – are then entirely identified 
by the benchmark SAMs. Several of the model parameters, such as the factor productivity 
parameters governing the rate of autonomous technical progress are time-variant in the 
dynamic simulation analysis. The dynamic calibration of these time-variant parameters is 
discussed in the context of the description of the dynamic baseline construction process in 
sections 4 and 5 below. 
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Table 1: Kenya Model Production Sectors 
Short Code Description Share in GTAP GDP 2011 
Agriculture Agriculture 0.224 
Forestry Forestry 0.013 
Fishing Fishing 0.006 
Mining Mining and Quarrying 0.006 
ProcFood Food Processing 0.168 
BevTob Beverages and Tobacco 0.093 
TexCloth Textiles, Clothing, Footwear and Leather 0.011 
Petrol Petrol Refining 0.001 
Chemics Chemicals, Rubber and Platic Products 0.009 
OLightMnf Other Light Manufacturing 0.036 
OHeavyMnf Other Heavy Manufacturing 0.018 
ElTD Electricity Transmission and Distribution 0.001 
ElGeoTh Geo-Thermal Electricity Generation 0.002 
ElHydro Hydro Electricity Generation  0.004 
ElThermal Fossil Fuel Based Electricity Generation 0.002 
ElWind Wind Powered  Electricity Generation 0.000 
Construction Construction Services 0.035 
TradeSv Trade Services 0.048 
TransSv Transport Services 0.061 
OServices Other Services 0.269 
 
 
Table 2: Ghana Model Production Sectors 
Short Code Description Share in GTAP GDP 2011 
Agriculture Agriculture 0.236 
Forestry Forestry 0.007 
Fishing Fishing 0.018 
CrudeOil Crude Oil and Natural Gas 0.063 
Mining Mining and Quarrying 0.008 
ProcFood Food Processing 0.042 
BevTob Beverages and Tobacco 0.010 
TexCloth Textiles, Clothing, Footwear and Leather 0.012 
Petrol Petrol Refining 0.001 
Chemics Chemicals, Rubber and Platic Products 0.008 
OLightMnf Other Light Manufacturing 0.018 
OHeavyMnf Other Heavy Manufacturing 0.031 
ElTD Electricity Transmission and Distribution 0.001 
ElHydro Hydro Electricity Generation  0.008 
ElThermal Fossil Fuel Based Electricity Generation 0.000 
Construction Construction Services 0.138 
TradeSv Trade Services 0.054 
TransSv Transport Services 0.105 
OServices Other Services 0.240 
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4. Dynamic Scenario Analysis: Kenya 
4.1. Overview 
The simulation analysis for Kenya considers four dynamic scenarios up to 2025 that differ with 
respect to (i) the evolution of the power mix in on-grid electricity generation and (ii) the 
evolution of world market fossil fuel prices. Table 3 provides a concise outline of the alternative 
scenario assumptions along these two dimensions.  
The specification of the lower carbon scenarios is motivated by the results of the comparative 
LCOE analysis by Pueyo et al (2016, 2017) which indicates a clear cost advantage of 
geothermal over all other electricity generation technologies and by the presence of a 
considerable potential for the further expansion of geothermal capacity in the country. The 
consideration of alternative conceivable time paths for the evolution of international fossil fuel 
prices is motivated by the strong sensitivity of the cost differences between thermal and 
renewables to fossil price projections. 
 
Table 3: Schematic Outline of Scenarios for Kenya 
 Business as Usual Power Mix Lower Carbon Power Mix 
Low Fossil Fuel Prices Baseline Scenario 
 
Power mix follows current 10-Year 
Plan: 
Rising share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
Constant share of Geothermal 
Rising but small share of Wind 
_________________________ 
 
Oil import price 50% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 55% below 
2011 level 
Lower Carbon Scenario 
 
 
 
Falling share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
Rising Share of Geothermal 
Rising but small share of Wind 
__________________________ 
 
Oil import price 50% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 55% below 
2011 level 
High Fossil Fuel Prices High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 
 
Power mix follows current 10-Year 
Plan: 
Rising share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
Constant share of Geothermal 
Rising but small share of Wind 
_________________________ 
 
Oil import price 19% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 17% below 
2011 level 
Lower Carbon HFFP Scenario 
 
 
 
Falling share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
Rising Share of Geothermal 
Rising but small share of Wind 
__________________________ 
 
Oil import price 19% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 17% below 
2011 level 
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4.2. Baseline Scenario 
The dynamic baseline scenario provides a projection of the evolution of Kenya’s economy up 
to 2025 under the assumptions that international oil and gas prices remain at low 2015/16 levels 
and that the evolution of the electricity generation capacity from hydro, geothermal and wind 
follows Kenya’s 10 Year Power Sector Expansion Plan 2014-2024 (Republic of Kenya, 2014) 
under the Plan’s moderate load growth scenario. 
The construction of the baseline scenario starts from the 2011 benchmark SAM outlined in 
section 3. For the period up to 2015, the forward projection takes account of the most recent 
available data observations, while the projections from 2016 to 2025 draw upon expert 
forecasts for the determination of the main model-exogenous drivers of economic growth 
(Table 4). 13 
 
4.2.1. Population and Labour Force Growth 
Population and labour force growth is based on the UN DESA (2015) medium-variant 
projections commonly used in contemporary long-run scenario studies. According to these 
projections, the total population of Kenya rises from 42.5 million in 2012 to 58.6 million in 
2025. As shown, the scenario takes into account that over this period the annual growth rate of 
the working-age population – and thus the labour force growth rate in the model under the 
assumption of a constant participation rate - remains considerably higher than the population 
growth rate.  
 
4.2.2. Total Factor Productivity and GDP Growth  
The second exogenous driver of economic growth in the model is the economy-wide total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth rate, which reflects the speed of autonomous technical 
progress. In the development of the baseline scenario, the time path for the annual TFP growth 
rate is determined indirectly by imposing a target growth path for Kenya’s real gross domestic 
product (GDP) (see Table 4) and by calibrating the TFP parameter of the model dynamically 
                                                 
13 The final specification of the baseline scenario benefited from insightful discussions with Helen Osiolo, 
Bernadette Wanjala, James Gachanja and Nahashon Mwongera (all KIPPRA) during a visit to Nairobi in 
November 2016.  
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to match this target growth path. Technically, to obtain the TFP growth path the model is first 
simulated in a dynamic calibration mode in which GDP is exogenized while the TFP parameter 
is treated as an endogenous variable. When the model is then simulated in normal mode, with 
GDP as an endogenous variable and exogenous imposition of the TFP growth path obtained in 
the dynamic calibration run, the model solution exactly replicates the target GDP growth path. 
The GDP baseline scenario growth rates up to 2015 are the reported actual national accounts 
figure and the projections up to 2018 are taken from KIPPRA (2016). The assumed constant 
growth rate of 7.5 percent per annum beyond 2018 is an optimistic compromise between the 
annual growth rate target of 10 percent envisaged in Kenya’s aspirational Vision 2030 
development plan (Republic of Kenya, 2007) for the same period and the growth rates projected 
by the CGE model under the assumption that TFP grows at a moderate pace that is more in line 
with the country’s actual observed growth performance over recent years: The average annual 
TFP growth rate for the period 2011-2015 that is required in the model to replicate Kenya’s 
actual GDP growth reported in Table 4 is 0.8 percent14 and the corresponding rate for the period 
2016 to 2018 is 2.8 percent. To reach the assumed 7.5 percent GDP growth rate beyond 2018, 
the average annual TFP growth rate needs to rise further to reach 3.3 percent. Thus, the baseline 
scenario implies a strong acceleration in the growth rate of technical progress, yet the TFP 
growth rate figures are not entirely implausible, provided a significant portion of the measures 
to modernize the economy envisaged in the Kenya Vision 2030 are actually implemented over 
the time horizon considered here. However, GDP growth rates on the order of 10 percent per 
annum would require TFP growth rates well above 5 percent. Assuming a sustained 
productivity acceleration of such an order would seem to be unrealistic, given Kenya’s actual 
growth performance under the Vision 2030 plan so far.15 
 
  
                                                 
14 This CGE-model-determined figure matches closely with the corresponding growth-accounting-based estimate 
of 0.8 percent TFP for Kenya in 2015 and average annual TFP growth of 0.6 percent over the period 2011 to 2015 
presented in The Conference Board (2016). 
15 As shown in Republic of Kenya (2013: Table 2.1), in every single year of the first five-year implementation 
phase (2008/9 to 2012/13) Kenya missed the Vision 2030 GDP growth targets by a wide margin (i.e. by 4.0 to 4.6 
percentage points). Despite a downward revision of the target rates for 2013 to 2015 (ibid: Table 2.2), Kenya’s 
actual growth performance remained well below target subsequently, and the KIPPRA expert projections for 2016 
to 2018 (Table 4 above) are likewise far below the annual 10 percent plan target. 
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Table 4: Key Features of Dynamic Baseline Scenario - Kenya 
 Annual Growth Rates   World Market Prices 
Year GDP GDP per cap. Labor Force Population Population CrudeOil  Natural Gas 
 % % %  1000 Price Index (2011 = 1) 
2012 4.6 1.9 2.87 2.71   42 543 1.01 1.02 
2013 5.7 3.0 2.89 2.70   43 693 0.98 1.23 
2014 5.3 2.6 2.93 2.68   44 864 0.89 1.16 
2015 5.6 3.0 2.96 2.65   46 050 0.51 0.83 
2016 5.7 3.1 2.96 2.61   47 251 0.50 0.44 
2017 6.1 3.5 2.99 2.57   48 467 0.50 0.44 
2018 6.1 3.6 3.02 2.53   49 695 0.50 0.44 
2019 7.5 5.0 3.04 2.50   50 935 0.50 0.44 
2020 7.5 5.0 3.05 2.46   52 187 0.50 0.44 
2021 7.5 5.1 2.96 2.42   53 448 0.50 0.44 
2022 7.5 5.1 2.98 2.38   54 719 0.50 0.44 
2023 7.5 5.2 2.98 2.34   56 001 0.50 0.44 
2024 7.5 5.2 2.96 2.32   57 298 0.50 0.44 
2025 7.5 5.2 2.94 2.29   58 610 0.50 0.44 
Sources: GDP growth: 2012, KNBS (2016); 2013-18 KIPPRA (2016); Population and labour  
force growth: UN DESA (2015), medium-variant projections. 
 
4.2.3. Electricity Sector  
The assumed evolution of the power mix in the baseline scenario draws upon Kenya’s 10 Year 
Power Sector Expansion Plan 2014-2024 (Republic of Kenya, 2014) while taking into account 
that under the assumed baseline economic growth path, the electricity demand growth over the 
simulation horizon endogenously generated by the CGE model is significantly lower than in 
the 10-Year Plan: This plan considers a high growth scenario with a ‘fast-tracked’ 
implementation of a range of energy-intensive Vision 2030 flagship investment projects16 and 
a ‘moderate load growth scenario’ with  a ‘deferred’ implementation of these flagship projects. 
 The high growth scenario assumes that GDP growth reaches 10.1 percent p.a. by 2018 and 
accelerates further to 12 percent p.a. by 2024. Effective electricity demand is projected to grow 
at average annual rate of 17.4 percent between 2015 and 2024 to reach 56,447 GWh by 2024 
                                                 
16 These include inter alia major investments in iron ore smelting capacity, the eventual electrification of the new 
standard gauge rail link between Nairobi and Mombasa (initially served by diesel-fuelled locomotives), the 
development of a large-scale ICT park at Kenzo City south of Nairobi, the establishment of several special 
economic zones and the development of the Lamu-Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor 
project. 
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(Republic of Kenya, 2014: Table 28) Based on least cost power expansion simulations17, this 
scenario proposes a strong expansion in hydro capacity (+74 percent relative to 2013) and 
massive expansions in geothermal (+1,200 percent), thermal (~ +2,400 percent) and wind (~ 
+18,600 percent from a tiny base) by 2024 to satisfy this demand growth (Republic of Kenya, 
2014: Table 25). The projected domestic generation shares in 2024 under average hydrological 
conditions in this scenario are 47.2 percent for geothermal, 42.5 percent for thermal, 9.5 percent 
for hydro and 0.8 percent for wind. The scenario envisages that coal-fired power generation 
starts in 2016 and then rapidly expands to reach a share of 17.4 percent in total generation by 
2024. With respect to the plausibility and economic viability of this scenario, the Plan itself 
states that 
“under the fast-tracked scenario, there would be a huge power surplus if demand does not grow fast enough which 
could lead to stranded investments and/or high power tariffs. Additionally, the report reveals that high cost 
technologies such as the thermal power plants particularly those planned for commissioning in 2014 may be poorly 
dispatched in the medium to long term while base plants such as coal and LNG may end up being run at below 
optimal levels of less than 70%” (Republic of Kenya, 2014:5). 
According to the latest KNBS (2016b) figures actual electricity generation in 2015 was some 
30 percent below the corresponding 2015 projection under this scenario and the plans for the 
construction of Kenya’s first coal-fired power plant in Lamu as well as related plans for the 
exploitation of domestic coal resources detected in the Mui Basin are on hold.18 Thus, the 10-
Year Plan’s high growth scenario provides no suitable basis for the development of a plausible 
baseline scenario for purposes of the present study. 
The ‘moderate load growth’ scenario of the 10-Year plan assumes that annual GDP growth 
rises to 10 percent by 2020 and that the economy continues to grow at that rate up to 2024. The 
aforementioned flagship investments are implemented slightly later than in the high growth 
scenarios and the connection rate reaches 60 percent by 2024. Effective electricity demand is 
projected to grow at average annual rate of 15.5 percent between 2015 and 2024 and reaches 
38,413 GWh by 2024 (Republic of Kenya, 2014: Table 33). Hydro capacity is projected to 
jump by 61 percent in 2019 relative to a constant 2014-2018 level with no further expansion 
up to 2024, geothermal capacity expands by 288 percent between 2014 and 2024, thermal by 
322 percent, and wind generation capacity expands by a factor of 24.5 relative to the small 
2014 level (Republic of Kenya, 2014: Table 32). The projected domestic generation shares in 
                                                 
17 These simulations are an update of the earlier 2013 Least Cost Power Sector Development Plan (Republic of 
Kenya, 2013b). 
18 See Praxides (2016) and Kenya Engineer (2016). 
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2024 in this scenario are 48.2 percent for geothermal, 39.2 percent for thermal, 11.7 percent 
for hydro and 0.8 percent for wind. Coal-fired power plants start operating from 2019 and reach 
a share of 20.9 percent in total domestic electricity generation by 2024. 
As discussed in section 4.2.2 above, our baseline scenario is an optimistic scenario but uses 
lower GDP growth projections than the 10-Year Plan’s so-called ‘moderate load growth 
scenario’. Correspondingly, the electricity demand growth projected by the CGE model - which 
equates to an annualized average growth rate of 12.8 percent over the period 2015 to 2025 - is 
significantly below the Plan’s average annual growth rate of 15.5 percent. In absolute terms, 
this demand growth differential translates into a marked difference between the 2025 CGE-
model-based baseline projection of 35,641 GWh (Table 5) for domestic supply and a one-year 
forward projection of the Plan’s 2024 domestic supply, which amounts to nearly 44,000 
GWh.19 It is noteworthy, that this difference is larger than the entire projected coal-based 
generation for 2024 (7,965 GWh) according to the Plan. Thus, no coal-fired power-plants at all 
are required in our baseline scenario. 
 
Table 5: Domestic Electricity Generation by Type – Baseline Scenario 
  Electricity Generation  (GWh) 
Year Total Hydro Geothermal Thermal Wind 
2011 7250 3427 1453 2352 18 
2015 10675 3427 5333 1868 47 
2020 22735 4466 11343 6829 97 
2025 35641 4466 18331 12529 315 
  Shares  (%) 
2011 100.0 47.3 20.0 32.4 0.2 
2015 100.0 32.1 50.0 17.5 0.4 
2020 100.0 19.6 49.9 30.0 0.4 
2025 100.0 12.5 51.4 35.2 0.9 
Sources: All figures for 2011 and all GWh figures for Hydro, Geothermal and Wind:  
Republic of Kenya (2014: Tables 6 and 33). Domestic total generation figures are model- 
determined and Thermal shares beyond 2015 follow residually. Actual provisional 2015 figures  
in KNBS (2016b) released after the completion of the baseline construction: Total: 9456 GWh,  
Hydro: 3463 GWh (36.6%), Geothermal: 4521 GWh (47.8%), Thermal 1412 GWh (14.9%). 
 
                                                 
19 Projected total supply (=effective demand) for 2024 is 38,413 GWh and projected 2024 imports are 356GWh 
(Republic of Kenya, 2014: Table 33). (38,413 – 356)(1+0.155) = 43,956. 
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As shown in Table 5, the baseline scenario assumes that hydro, geothermal and wind generation 
evolves in line with the moderate load growth scenario of the 10 Year Power Sector Expansion 
Plan20 while thermal (gas- and oil-fired) generation fills the gap between total demand and non-
fossil-based supply. Correspondingly, the direction of the changes in the power mix over the 
period 2015 to 2025 are broadly in line with the 10-Year Plan moderate scenario, in the sense 
that (i) the hydro share drops markedly despite a substantial increase in absolute capacity, (ii) 
the geothermal share remains roughly constant following the rapid increase over the period 
2011 to 2015, which means that absolute geothermal generation grows strongly and 
approximately in proportion to total electricity demand, (iii) the share of thermal rises strongly, 
and (iv) the wind share roughly doubles but remains below one percent. 
The main difference to the Plan scenario is that, due to the lower overall electricity demand 
growth, the baseline 2025 thermal share is slightly lower (35.2 versus 39.2 percent) and greener 
as it contains no coal-fired generation. 
According to the moderate load growth scenario, the share of diesel within total non-coal 
thermal generation, which was 100 percent in the benchmark year 2011, drops markedly to 58 
percent in 2015 and further to 14 percent in 2024 as diesel-fired generation is replaced by gas-
fired generation. However, as the recent cancellation of the planned Dongu Kundu gas power 
station project indicates21, such a shift appears unlikely to happen within the time horizon of 
the present study. Thus the baseline scenario assumes that thermal generation continues to 
remain entirely heavy-fuel-oil-fired. Nevertheless the cost disadvantage of thermal relative to 
geothermal drops significantly relative to the initial 2011 differential as a result of the assumed 
permanent oil price drop. 
The baseline scenario captures the increase in household connectivity rates and the additional 
increase in commercial electricity demand assumed in the 10-Year Plan in a stylized form 
through gradual exogenous increases in the model parameters governing the shares of 
electricity consumption in total household consumption22 and in intermediate consumption. 
                                                 
20 With a slight lag over the 2021-2025 period, so that the Plan’s generation figures for 2024 are realized in year 
2025 of the baseline scenario. 
21 See Okuti (2016). 
22 As a technical aside for readers interested in the mechanics of the CGE model, this requires a recalibration of 
all other LES demand system parameters at each annual time step of the dynamic solution loop in order to maintain 
the theoretical consistency of the model. It is also worth noting in this context that the budget shares of electricity 
in total household spending in the model would increase even in the absence of exogenous shifts in the marginal 
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The additional increases in commercial electricity demand due to the promotion of the said 
Kenya Vision 2030 flagship projects and due to wider across-the-board shifts to more 
electrified modes of production as the Kenyan economy develops are captured in the CGE 
model via gradual increases in the electricity input-output coefficients for sectors where the 
2011 GTAP electricity input-output coefficients are well below the average across lower 
middle income countries in the GTAP database. Shifts to more electrified modes of production 
reduce the need for physical labour and basic capital inputs to some extent, and so the 
technology parameters governing the demand for primary factors are gradually revised 
downwards accordingly in these sectors. Figure 2 displays the baseline 2025 shares of 
electricity in total production cost for all sectors in which this share exceeds one percent.  
 
 
Figure 2: Share of Electricity Cost in Total Baseline Production Cost 2025 – Selected 
Sectors 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
budget share parameters, as the assumed income elasticities of household demand for electricity for Kenya (see 
section 3 above) are well above unity across all household categories. 
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4.3. Lower Carbon Scenario 
4.3.1. Scenario Specification 
Considering alternative conceivable pathways towards a less carbon-intensive power mix, the 
LCOE analysis for the GGDA project by Pueyo et al (2016) identifies geothermal electricity 
generation as the most promising technology option for Kenya.  This assessment is in line with 
Kenyan government’s own assessment in the 10 Year Power Sector Expansion Plan: 
“In Kenya, more than 14 high temperature potential sites occur along Rift Valley with an estimated potential of 
more than 10,000 MW. Other locations include Homa Hills in Nyanza, Mwananyamala at the Coast and 
Nyambene Ridges in Meru. The expansion to existing geothermal operations offers the least cost, environmentally 
clean source of energy (green) and highest potential to the country”. (Republic of Kenya, 2014:101). 
The following simulation analysis contemplates a deliberately drastic scenario in which the 
geothermal share in total domestic generation increases from 2018 onwards along a steep linear 
schedule to reach 75 percent in 2025, so that the 2025 geothermal share is 23.6 percentage 
points higher than in the baseline. The thermal share drops correspondingly from 35.2 percent 
in the 2025 baseline to 11.6 percent (Table 6 and Figure 3a). The hydro and wind shares remain 
unchanged. In absolute terms, this assumed expansion of geothermal electricity generation by 
2025 is very close to the 10 Year Plan’s least-cost high growth scenario, in which geothermal 
is projected to generate 26,000 GWh by 2024.  
 
Table 6: Geothermal and Thermal Shares in Total Power Mix – Lower Carbon 
Scenario 
(Percentage Shares) 
Year Baseline Lower Carbon 
  Geothermal Thermal Geothermal Thermal 
2015 50.0 17.5 50.0 17.5 
2016 52.7 17.6 52.7 17.6 
2017 53.9 18.9 53.9 18.9 
2018 51.9 24.2 58.7 17.4 
2019 50.7 27.6 62.4 15.9 
2020 49.9 30.0 65.4 14.6 
2021 50.8 30.8 68.7 12.9 
2022 51.4 31.7 71.3 11.8 
2023 51.7 32.6 73.2 11.2 
2024 51.7 33.8 74.4 11.1 
2025 51.4 35.2 75.0 11.6 
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For a proper interpretation of this scenario it is important to emphasize that the falling share of 
thermal does not imply an absolute contraction of thermal generation. Given the strong overall 
electricity demand growth, thermal generation still grows year on year, albeit at a lower rate 
than in the baseline (Figure 3b). 
 
 
Figure 3a: Power Mix in Baseline and Lower Carbon Scenario 
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Figure 3b: Annual Electricity Generation in Baseline and Lower Carbon Scenario 
(in GWh) 
 
 
 
4.3.2. Results 
The assumed gradual shift from high-cost thermal to lower-cost geothermal electricity 
generation entails a notable drop in the effective average supply price relative to the baseline 
scenario. As shown in Figure 4, in 2025 the domestic electricity price – here expressed relative 
to the equilibrium wage of unskilled workers – is over 12 percent lower than in the baseline 
scenario. The reduction in the cost of electricity affects the production costs and thus the supply 
prices across all sectors and is more pronounced in sectors with a higher share of electricity in 
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total cost (Figure 4) such as mining, the chemical industry and heavy manufacturing than in 
sectors with a low power intensity. 
 
Figure 4: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices – Lower Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
The assumed low carbon transition entails a strong reduction in fossil fuel imports. Both refined 
petrol and crude oil imports drop by nearly ten percent in volume terms relative to the baseline 
scenario towards 2025 (Figure 4). The indirect effect on crude oil imports arises due to the fact 
that in the baseline scenario Kenya’s domestic petrol refining sector – which actually ceased 
production in the second half of 2013 – is reactivated as envisaged in the 2015 National Energy 
and Petroleum Policy Draft (Republic of Kenya, 2015) and as part of the aforementioned 
LAPSSET flagship development. In the baseline projection this sector operates at a modest 
scale using imported crude oil, with a negligible 2025 baseline contribution to GDP and total 
employment.  
As Kenya remains a net importer of fossil fuels in the baseline scenario, the drop in the fossil 
fuel import bill is associated with a real exchange rate appreciation on the order of 0.7 percent. 
The real appreciation lowers in tendency the prices of imports relative to domestically produced 
goods from the perspective of domestic residents. This induces a substitution effect towards 
imports for commodities in cases where the exchange rate effect dominates the simultaneous 
drop in the prices of domestic output due to the electricity cost reduction in the new 
equilibrium. This substitution effect affects both imports of final goods and intermediate inputs. 
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A further positive effect on imports across all final goods arises due the positive aggregate real 
income effects associated with the shift towards lower-cost electricity generation shown below. 
Thus, Figure 5 shows moderate welfare-raising increases in the import quantities relative to 
baseline levels for most traded non-fuel goods and services and these are generally more 
pronounced for the commodity groups with smaller domestic supply price reductions according 
to Figure 4. 
 
Figure 5: Impact on Real Import Volumes by Commodity Group – Lower Carbon 
Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
 
Note: This figure excludes commodity groups with negligible shares in Kenya’s total imports. 
 
On the export side, the real exchange rate appreciation effect per se reduces in tendency the 
price of exports relative to the price obtained in the domestic market from the viewpoint of 
domestic producers, and thus shifts the optimal profit-maximizing output mix between export 
and home market production in favour of the latter. Correspondingly, Figure 6 reports moderate 
drops in export quantities for most sectors. An exception is heavy manufacturing, which is the 
sector with the highest electricity cost share. In this case, the cost reduction effect dominates 
the exchange rate effect, so that exports expand. 
The trade effects shown in Figure 5 and 6 can also be explained from a balance-of-payments 
perspective: The reduction in the fossil fuel import bill relaxes the balance-of-payments 
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constraint as it allows domestic residents to enjoy simultaneously an increase in real imports 
and a higher share in domestically produced output, as less of that output needs to be shipped 
abroad to pay the import bill. 
 
Figure 6: Impact on Real Export Volumes by Commodity Group – Lower Carbon 
Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
 
Note: The figure excludes commodity groups for which both the baseline share in total export 
revenue is small (<2.5 percent) and the export/output share is small (<10 percent). 
 
The equilibrium impact on real gross output by production sector for 2025 compared to the 
baseline scenario is shown in Figure 7. The sectoral employment effects have the same 
direction and broadly the same orders of magnitude, and are therefore not separately plotted. 
Not surprisingly, in percentage terms the effect on the size of the small domestic oil refinery 
sector in relation to the baseline is most pronounced as the demand growth for fuel by thermal 
power plants slows down. However in relation to total employment the associated employment 
reallocation effects are tiny. The domestic power sector expands as the drop in electricity prices 
induces additional demand. 
It is worth emphasizing that no sector contracts in absolute terms and thus no sector sheds 
existing workers along the dynamic scenario time path. A negative-signed output effect in 
Figure 7 merely indicates that the sector grows at a lower rate and that new workers are hired 
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endpoint of the simulation horizon is projected to be nearly 10 percent smaller than in the 
baseline scenario for the same year, the sector is still 127 percent larger in 2025 than in 2027. 
In line with economic theory, the real exchange appreciation shifts in tendency productive 
resources from traded to non-traded activities. Among the non-power sectors that expand 
relative to baseline are all sectors that have simultaneously negligible or small export / output 
shares and negligible or little competition from imports in their domestic market, such as 
construction services the fishery sector, and trade services. In contrast, the small domestic 
mining sector with its baseline export-output ratio of over 75 percent and an import share of 
over 50 percent in Kenya’s domestic demand for mining products is squeezed noticeably as 
mining exports drop and mining imports rise. The sectors that expand despite relatively high 
trade shares are heavy manufacturing are heavy manufacturing, which – as noted earlier – are 
among the most electricity-intensive sectors and thus benefit disproportionally from the 
reduction in energy input costs. However, the main message from Figure 7 is that the effects 
of the assumed low carbon transition on the sectoral composition of output and employment 
are very moderate. 
 
Figure 7: Impact on Real Output by Sector – Lower Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
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The real resource savings associated with the switch to a lower-cost mode of electricity 
generation is reflected in a moderately positive transitory effect on GDP growth as shown in 
Figure 8. Like in a standard Solow growth model, the long-run growth rate in this multi-sectoral 
dynamic CGE model is exogenously determined by the sum of the aggregate growth rate of 
technical progress and the labour force growth rate. As these rates remain the same as in the 
baseline, the annual GDP growth rate in a hypothetical dynamic long-run equilibrium without 
further changes in exogenous parameter would eventually converge back to the baseline growth 
rates, yet the positive effect on the level of GDP is of course permanent along such a steady 
state path. The cumulative effect of the small annual growth rate increments reported in Figure 
8 over the period 2018 to 2025 entails that the level of real GDP by 2025 is 1.1 percent higher 
than in the baseline scenario. 
 
Figure 8: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – Baseline and Low Carbon Scenario 
(in Percent) 
 
 
Turning to the effects on the functional income distribution – that is the distribution of primary 
income by type of factor – Figure 9 displays the impacts on real factor prices (i.e. nominal 
factor prices deflated by the consumer price index) in 2020 and 2025 relative to the baseline 
level in the corresponding year. By 2025 the real returns to all factors except mineral resources 
are slightly higher than in the baseline. Capital returns rise relative to labour wages and the 
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The differential factor price effect arise from factor intensity differentials between sectors that 
grow quicker and sectors that grow slower than in the baseline (recall Figure 7): On balance, 
the higher-growing sectors as a group are relatively skill- and capital-intensive and thus their 
additional factor input demand drives up capital returns and skilled wages more than unskilled 
wages.  
The natural resource rent drop is due to the growth slow-down of the domestic mining sector 
which is the sole user of the mineral endowment factor in the model. The reason for the reversal 
of the effect on agricultural land rents is related to the fact that electricity use in agriculture is 
initially very low but grows over time with technical progress and the rise in rural access rates. 
Thus, agriculture initially benefits very little from the drop in electricity prices while being hit 
by the exchange rate appreciation effect on agricultural exports and imports (Figure 5 and 6). 
As a result, agricultural output drops marginally (by 0.1 percent) below baseline levels over 
the initial period up to 2020 but then recovers subsequently (and ends up 0.1 percent above 
base level by 2025) as the direct and indirect23 input cost reduction effects become more 
pronounced over time. 
For households with a single source of factor income, Figure 9 directly indicates the direction 
of the effects on total factor income. Figure 10 shows the implications for mixed-income 
households with factor income mixes equal to the income compositions of the four household 
categories the benchmark SAM. Both lower and higher income households gain. However, 
since the urban and rural high-income groups have higher shares of capital and skilled labour 
in their total income mix than the low-income groups, the former groups gain disproportionally. 
In other words, as far as this rather coarse-grained distributional analysis based on outdated 
underlying raw data goes, the low-carbon transition has a pro-poor effect in an absolute or 
“weak” sense (namely that the poorer households are better off than in the baseline), but is not 
pro-poor in a relative or “strong” sense (i.e. the poorer households do not gain 
disproportionally).24 
 
 
                                                 
23 E.g. the drop in chemical fertilizer prices. 
24 See Willenbockel (2015) for critical reflections on the recent literature concerned with pro-poor low-carbon 
development in this context. 
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Figure 9: Impact on Factor Returns – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation of factor prices relative to CPI baseline level 2020 and 2025) 
 
 
Figure 10: Impact on Real Household Income – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation from Baseline level 2020 and 2025)  
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4.4. High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 
As the cost differentials between thermal and renewable technologies are necessarily 
contingent on the assumptions about future fossil fuel prices over the lifetime of thermal power 
plants, and the results of the quantitative low-carbon scenario analysis are driven by the size of 
these cost differentials, section 4.5 assesses the sensitivity of the findings in the previous 
section to a variation in the assumed exogenous international fossil fuel price time paths. In 
contrast to the baseline scenario, crude oil and refined petrol world prices are now assumed to 
return to higher levels beyond 2016. More specifically, between 2016 and 2018 oil prices rise 
linearly to a level that is 62 percent higher than the 2018 baseline price (but still 19 percent 
lower than the 2011 benchmark price) and then stay put at that level beyond 2018.25 
The high fossil fuel price scenario under baseline assumptions about the power mix provides 
the relevant reference scenario for comparison with the high-fossil-fuel-price (HFFP) lower 
carbon scenario presented in the following section. In other words, this reference scenario 
serves to enable an analytical separation of impacts due to exogenous changes in the power 
mix from the HFFP impacts. As the purpose of this study is not to provide an exhaustive 
analysis of the sensitivity of Kenya’s economy to oil price shocks, the exposition of this 
reference scenario can be concise and focuses on key differences to the baseline scenario. 
Figure 11 displays the effects on domestic supply prices in 2025 relative to the baseline. Not 
surprisingly, the size orders of the sectoral price effects are highly correlated with the sectoral 
baseline energy cost (i.e. direct fossil fuel cost plus electricity cost) shares in total production 
costs: As shown in Figure 12, the cross-sectoral variation in baseline energy cost shares 
explains nearly 98 percent of the cross-sectoral variation in the price impacts. 
These price increases entail a marked growth slow-down in the most affected sectors (in 
particular mining, petrol, electricity and transport services). In macroeconomic terms, the 
simulated oil price shock is an adverse terms-of-trade shock, i.e. the aggregate ratio of import 
prices paid by Kenya to export prices paid by the rest of the world for Kenya’s exports rises. 
Thus, Kenya must devote more domestic productive resources to export production at the 
expense of production for the home market in order to pay for the higher import bill. The 
                                                 
25 International gas prices also return to a higher level (Table 3), but in the case of Kenya assumptions about the 
gas import price matter very little as gas imports remain tiny under the maintained assumption that thermal 
generation continues to be oil-fired over the simulation horizon. 
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welfare-reducing terms-of trade shock requires a real exchange depreciation on the order of 7.6 
percent by 2025 relative to the baseline. The depreciation effect discourages imports and 
stimulates exports. The sectors that expand in relation to the baseline are sectors with both low 
energy cost shares and relatively high initial export-output ratios, in particular agriculture, food 
processing, and textiles and clothing. In those sectors, the stimulating export growth effect due 
to the exchange rate depreciation dominates the output-depressing rise in energy costs. 
The effects on GDP growth are displayed in Figures 13 and 14. GDP growth rates are hit 
strongly initially and then recover partially as international oil prices settle at the new higher 
level and the economy adapts to the shock. By 2025, the annual growth rate is still about 0.7 
percentage points below the baseline growth rate. The simulation results suggest that by 2025 
the level of GDP would be some 9 percent below base (Figure 14). 
The real income loss is reflected in a slower growth of real wages, capital returns and natural 
resource rents. Because of the marked growth slow-down in the mining sector, the drop in 
resource rents is particularly pronounced. Only the real returns to land rise relative to the 
baseline as a result of the afore-mentioned increase in agricultural output and exports. This 
effect is reinforced by the expansion of food processing exports, which raises the demand for 
agricultural output further via backward linkage effects. 
 
Figure 11: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices - High Oil Price Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
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Figure 12: Correlation between Domestic Supply Price Changes and Baseline Energy 
Cost Shares 2025 – HFFP Scenario 
(dPX: Deviation of 2025 domestic supply prices from baseline in percent) 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – Baseline and High Oil Price Scenario 
(in Percent) 
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Figure 14: Level of Real GDP 2015 to 2025 - Baseline and High Oil Price Scenario 
(Index, 2015 = 1.0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Impact on Factor Returns - High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 
(Percentage deviation from Baseline level 2020 and 2025) 
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4.5. HFFP Lower Carbon Scenario 
Since higher fossil fuel prices increase the cost advantage of geothermal vis-à-vis thermal 
power generation, the positive effect of the shift to a higher geothermal share on real GDP 
growth is noticeably stronger than in the previous lower carbon scenario (Figure 16 and Figure 
8). The cumulative effect of the increases in annual GDP growth means that by 2025 GDP is 
2.6 percent higher than in the HFFP reference scenario. The corresponding GDP increase 
reported in section 4.3 for the low-oil-price case amounted to 1.1 percent. 
The real exchange rate appreciation associated with the lower dependency on fossil fuel 
imports is on the order of 1.2 percent by 2025 and thus likewise slightly more pronounced than 
the corresponding real appreciation of 0.7 percent reported in section 4.3. As illustrated by 
Figure 17 for domestic producer prices, the general pattern of the sectoral effects is the same 
as in the earlier lower carbon scenario, but in quantitative terms the sectoral changes in output, 
employment and trade flows are again moderately stronger.  
 
Figure 16: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – High Fossil Fuel Price Lower Carbon 
Scenario 
(in Percent) 
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discussed in section 4.4, the export-output ratio of agriculture is higher in the HFFP reference 
scenario than in the baseline scenario, since Kenya needs to export more to pay for the higher 
fossil fuel import bill. Thus the stronger real appreciation under the HFFP low carbon scenario 
which slows down agricultural export growth has a stronger effect on agricultural output 
growth than in the low carbon scenario under low oil prices. As a result, agricultural land rents 
grow slightly slower than in the HFFP reference scenario up to 2025, whereas Figure 9 reports 
a reversal of the impacts on real land rents between 2020 and 2025 as discussed in section 4.3. 
 
Figure 17: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices – High Fossil Fuel Price Lower Carbon 
Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
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share of electricity costs in total production cost and lower trade shares expand relative to 
sectors with a low electricity cost share and with less exposure to international trade. 
Moreover, the results in this section demonstrate that the size of the beneficial aggregate effects 
depends on the evolution of fossil fuel prices over the simulation horizon: Under the Lower 
Carbon scenario, real GDP in 2025 is about 1.1 percent higher than in the Baseline scenario. 
Under the Lower Carbon High Fossil Fuel Price scenario, real GDP in 2025 is more than 2 
percent higher than in the High Fossil Fuel Price scenario. 
 
Figure 18: Impact on Factor Returns – High Fossil Fuel Price Lower Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation from High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 2020 and 2025) 
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5. Dynamic Scenario Analysis: Ghana 
5.1. Overview 
The scenario design for the Ghana study follows the same basic logic as the Kenya study. We 
consider again four dynamic scenarios up to 2025 that differ with respect to (i) the evolution 
of the power mix in on-grid electricity generation and (ii) the evolution of world market fossil 
fuel prices. Table 7 outlines the alternative scenario assumptions along these two dimensions. 
The specification of the lower carbon scenarios is again motivated by the results of the 
comparative LCOE analysis by Pueyo et al (2016, 2017)  
 
Table 7: Schematic Outline of Scenarios for Kenya 
 Baseline Power Mix Lower Carbon Power Mix 
Low Fossil Fuel Prices Baseline Scenario 
 
Rising share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
_________________________ 
 
Oil import price 50% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 55% below 
2011 level 
Lower Carbon Scenario 
 
Less steep rise of Thermal share 
Less steep drop of Hydro share 
__________________________ 
 
Oil import price 50% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 55% below 
2011 level 
High Fossil Fuel Prices High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 
 
Rising share of Thermal 
Falling share of Hydro 
_________________________ 
 
Oil import price 19% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 17% below 
2011 level 
Lower Carbon HFFP Scenario 
 
Less steep rise of Thermal share 
Less steep drop of Hydro share 
 
__________________________ 
 
Oil import price 19% below 2011 
level; Gas import price 17% below 
2011 level 
 
 
5.2. Baseline Scenario 
The construction of the baseline scenario starts from the 2011 benchmark SAM for Ghana 
outlined in section 3. For the period up to 2015, the forward projection takes account of recent 
available data observations, while the projections from 2016 to 2025 draw upon expert 
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forecasts for the for the determination of the main model-exogenous drivers of economic 
growth (Table 8).26 
 
4.2.1. Population and Labour Force Growth 
Population and labour force growth is based on the UN DESA (2015) medium-variant 
projections commonly used in contemporary long-run scenario studies. According to these 
projections, the total population of Ghana rises from 25.5 million in 2012 to 33.7 million in 
2025. As shown, the scenario takes into account that over this period the annual growth rate of 
the working-age population – and thus the labour force growth rate in the model under the 
assumption of a constant participation rate - remains considerably higher than the population 
growth rate.  
 
5.2.2. Total Factor Productivity and GDP Growth  
The time path for the annual TFP growth rate is determined indirectly by imposing a target 
growth path for Ghana’s real GDP (Table 8) and by calibrating the TFP parameter of the model 
dynamically to match this target growth path as further explained in section 4.2.2 above.  
The GDP baseline scenario growth rates up to 2014 are the reported official national accounts 
figures (GSS, 2015) and the projections up to 2018 are taken from World Bank (2016). For the 
period beyond 2019 it is assumed that annual GDP continues to grow at rates just below the 
World Bank forecast for 2017/18, which is consistent with a plausible slightly decelerating 
TFP growth trend. The growth rates imply that aggregate GDP in 2025 is 2.68 times higher 
than in 2011 and per-capita GDP doubles over this period. 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 The final specification of the baseline scenario benefited from clarifying discussions with S. Bawakyillenuo 
and ISSER colleagues (who also provided access to additional GLSS data) during a visit to Accra in December 
2016.  
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5.2.3. Electricity Sector and Domestic Natural Gas Extraction 
The assumed evolution of the on-grid power mix in the baseline takes account of the Strategic 
National Energy Plan 2006-2020 (EnCG, 2006), the Energy Sector Strategy and Development 
Plan (Ministry of Energy, 2010), the Ministry of Petroleum’s Gas Master Plan (Republic of 
Ghana, 2015a), the Ghana SREP (Republic of Ghana, 2015b), and is also informed by a range 
of other sources including World Bank (2013), EnRC (2016) and IRENA (2015).  
The key assumptions for the construction of the baseline scenario are that (i) hydro capacity 
remains constant beyond 2015 up to 2025, i.e. the hydro share drops as total generation grows 
(Figure 19); (ii) the on-grid share of non-hydro renewables remains negligibly small, i.e. the 
binding constraints to investments in renewable energy capacity in Ghana identified by Pueyo 
et al (2017) are not relaxed, and thus Ghana’s official aspirational target to reach a renewable 
share (excluding large-scale hydro) of 10 percent by 2020 is not achieved; (iii) the rising gap 
between hydro generation and total demand for electricity is entirely bridged by additional 
thermal generation, and thus the share of thermal in total generation is rising; and (iv) the share 
of gas in total thermal generation is rapidly rising from 2018 onwards. 
In line with Ghana’s Gas Master Plan and the recommendations in World Bank (2013), the 
baseline scenario assumes further that natural gas extraction from domestic sources develops 
at a fast pace, so that by the 2020s a significant fraction of the expanding gas demand by the 
power sector is covered by domestically sourced supplies. According to the model-generated 
power demand projection, around 35,000 GWh of thermal generation would be required in 
2025 under the baseline assumption of a constant hydro capacity. About 350 billion cubic feet 
(bcf) of natural gas would be required to generate this amount of electricity. The Gas Master 
Plan’s most optimistic ‘balanced high case’ scenario projects 216 bcf for Ghana’s domestic 
natural gas production in 2025, and a ‘balanced base case’ scenario forecasts 111 bcf for the 
same year (Republic of Ghana, 2015a: Tables 43 and 41). At the midpoint between these two 
supply projections about 45 percent of the electricity sector’s natural gas demand could be 
satisfied from domestic sources by 2025. 
Technically these changes over the simulation horizon are implemented in the CGE model by 
shifts in the parameters  governing the gas import share and the share of natural gas output 
(which is virtually zero in the initial 2011 benchmark equilibrium) in the total output of 
Ghana’s oil-gas extraction sector from 2018 onwards together with corresponding shifts in the 
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sector’s natural resource factor supply, and by shifts in the thermal electricity sector’s input-
output parameters for crude oil27, natural gas and refined petrol. 
As in the Kenya study, the baseline scenario captures increase in household connectivity rates 
in a stylized form through gradual exogenous increases in the model parameters governing the 
shares of electricity consumption in total household consumption. Shifts to more electrified 
modes of production as the Kenyan economy develops are captured in the CGE model via 
gradual increases in the electricity input-output coefficients for sectors where the 2011 GTAP 
electricity input-output coefficients are well below the average across lower middle income 
countries in the GTAP database. Again, shifts to more electrified modes of production reduce 
the need for physical labour and basic capital inputs to some extent, and so the technology 
parameters governing the demand for primary factors are gradually revised downwards 
accordingly in these sectors.  
 
Table 8: Key Features of Dynamic Baseline Scenario – Ghana 
 
Sources: GDP Growth 2012-14, GSS (2015), 2015-18, World Bank (2016); Population and labour force  
growth: UN DESA (2015), medium-variant projections. 
 
 
                                                 
27 Presently, Ghana’s oil-fired thermal generation uses predominantly light crude oil (LCO). 
Year GDP GDP per cap. Labor Force Population Population CrudeOil Natural Gas
% % % 1000
2012 9.3 6.8 2.58 2.47   25 545 1.01 1.02
2013 7.3 4.9 2.49 2.43   26 164 0.98 1.23
2014 4.0 1.6 2.50 2.38   26 787 0.89 1.16
2015 3.4 1.1 2.56 2.33   27 410 0.51 0.83
2016 5.9 3.6 2.32 2.27   28 033 0.50 0.64
2017 8.2 6.0 2.46 2.22   28 657 0.50 0.44
2018 8.2 6.0 2.53 2.18   29 280 0.50 0.44
2019 8.1 6.0 2.51 2.13   29 905 0.50 0.44
2020 8.0 5.9 2.45 2.09   30 530 0.50 0.44
2021 8.0 5.9 2.43 2.05   31 158 0.50 0.44
2022 8.0 6.0 2.35 2.02   31 786 0.50 0.44
2023 8.0 6.0 2.33 1.98   32 416 0.50 0.44
2024 8.0 6.1 2.38 1.95   33 046 0.50 0.44
2025 8.0 6.1 2.47 1.91   33 678 0.50 0.44
Annual Growth Rates World Market Prices
Price Index (2011 = 1)
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5.3. Lower Carbon Scenario 
5.3.1. Scenario Specification 
As noted in Pueyo et al (2016:16), in comparison to Kenya Ghana’s “renewable energy 
potential is considerably smaller except for large hydropower, (…). Hydropower potential has 
been harnessed to a large extent but substantial potential is still untapped and several areas have 
been marked as potential sites for medium and mini hydropower plants”. In line with Table 1 
above, Pueyo et al (2017:29) report that “(o)ur estimates of LCOE for renewable power plants 
show hydropower is the least cost technology in Ghana, at 7.9 USc per KWh. The LCOE of 
generic wind power is 14.3 USc per KWh and that of solar PV 18.7 USc per KWh”, and thus 
wind and solar are not yet cost-competitive in relation to gas-fired power plants with an 
estimated LCOE of 13 USc per KWh (Table 1).  
IRENA (2015: Table 8) identifies small- and medium-scale hydro power sites with an 
estimated total capacity of 837 MW and a generation potential of around 3,500 GWh. IRENA 
estimates suggest that the LCOE “for new small hydropower projects is between USD 0.03 and 
USD 0.115/kWh in developing countries”,28 which is within the range of the LCOE estimate 
used for the initial calibration of the hydro sector parameters in the CGE model for Ghana. 
In line with these estimates, the stylized lower carbon scenario for Ghana considered here 
assumes a gradual linear expansion in hydro generation over the period 2018 to 2025 such that 
hydro generation is about 3,500 GWh higher than in the baseline by 2025. Thermal generation 
drops accordingly in relation to the baseline thermal expansion growth path. This means that 
the hydro share in total generation in 2025 is 7 percentage-points higher than in the baseline 
scenario and the 2025 thermal share drops from 83 to 76 percent (Figure 19) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 http://costing.irena.org/technology-costs/power-generation/hydropower.aspx (accessed December 2016). 
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Figure 19: Electricity Generation Shares in Baseline and Lower Carbon Scenario 
  
 
 
5.3.2. Results 
The moderate and gradual shift from thermal to hydro electricity generation entails modest 
changes in the system-wide average cost of electricity production over the period 2018 to 2025, 
and these cost reductions are by assumption fully passed on to electricity users. By 2025, the 
electricity supply price in this scenario is 1.1 percent lower than in the baseline (Figure 22). 
This electricity price effect is far less pronounced than the corresponding price effect in the 
low carbon scenario for Kenya (Figure 4), because the size order of the assumed shift from 
thermal to low-carbon power is far less extreme – which reflects the fact that Ghana’s potential 
for an economically viable expansion of small- and medium-scale hydro is far more limited 
than Kenya’s potential for an expansion of low-cost geothermal according to the cited studies.  
The dynamic macroeconomic adjustment process in this scenario is complicated by the fact 
that the baseline hydro-thermal generation cost differential endogenously generated by the 
CGE model has a hump-shaped time profile as shown in Figure 21: Over the period 2015 the 
thermal generation costs drop sharply relative to hydro unit costs, so that by 2017 the initial 
cost advantage of hydro turns into cost disadvantage. Beyond 2017 this trend reverses as the 
thermal unit cost begin to rise relative to the hydro unit costs and beyond 2021 hydro restores 
its status as the least-cost electricity technology. 
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Figure 20: Ratio of Average Hydro to Average Thermal Generation Cost 2015 - 2025 
 
 
Primarily three features of the baseline scenario drive this peculiar time path of the hydro / 
thermal cost differential. First, fossil fuel import prices and particularly gas prices drop strongly 
over the period 2015 to 2017 (Table 8), and entail a sharp drop in the thermal generation cost 
over this period. Second, the strong increase in demand for thermal electricity associated with 
the rise in the thermal share over the whole simulation horizon drives up the equilibrium rate 
of return to capital in the thermal sector – i.e. the return on investments in thermal capacity 
must rise in order to attract the new capital required for the expansion of the thermal sector. 
This effect raises the cost of capital in the thermal sector. Third, as Ghana has an initial trade 
deficit with the rest of the world and the foreign savings required to cover the trade deficit grow 
at a lower exogenous rate than Ghana’s real income and import demand, the real exchange rate 
depreciates slightly over the entire simulation interval.29 Thus, while fossil fuel prices remain 
constant beyond 2017 in foreign-currency terms, they rise gradually from 2018 to 2025 from 
the perspective of domestic firms and households due to the depreciation effect. The first effect 
dominates the time profile of the hydro / thermal cost differential up to 2017 while the second 
and third effect become jointly dominant after 2018. 
 
                                                 
29 Over the period 2015 to 2025, the baseline real exchange rate – here measured as aggregate import price relative 
to the domestic producer price index – rises by 5.4 percent.  
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Figure 20: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices – Lower Carbon Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
 
It is not surprising, that the small direct electricity cost reduction effect towards 2025 triggers 
only weak intersectoral spill-over effects via input-output linkages and other general 
equilibrium repercussions. As shown in Figure 21, the equilibrium effects on the supply prices 
of other sectors are generally tiny. The only noteworthy indirect price effect is the 0.8 percent 
drop in the domestic natural gas supply price. This effect occurs since the thermal sector 
expands at a lower rate than in the baseline, and thus its demand for gas grows at a lower rate. 
For the same reason, fossil fuel imports drop relative to the baseline (Figure 22). As in the case 
of Kenya, the reduction in the fossil fuel import bill entails a mild real exchange rate 
appreciation effect, i.e. the additional ‘space’ in Ghana’s external balance-of-payments account 
created by the reduced fossil fuel import payments enables a simultaneous increase in the 
volume of non-fuel imports and a reduction in the volume of exports that must be shipped to 
the rest of the world in order to pay for imports (Figures 22 and 23). 
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Figure 21: Impact on Real Import Volumes by Commodity Group – Lower Carbon 
Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
In an aggregate macroeconomic sense, the net welfare effect for Ghana associated with the low 
carbon transition scenario considered here is unambiguously positive: Using virtually the same 
total real resources as in the baseline, Ghana can simultaneously command a higher real volume 
of imports and retain a higher share of total domestic output as less of this output is exported 
than in the baseline.  
This positive welfare effect is reflected in a positive but very small increase in real GDP. The 
cumulative effect of the tiny annual growth rate increments reported in Figure 23 over the 
period 2021 to 2025 entails that the level of real GDP by 2025 is a negligible 0.025 percent 
higher than in the baseline scenario. Given, the high baseline annual growth rate of 8 percent, 
this difference is equivalent to about 1 day’s value of economic activity – i.e. the baseline 
growth path would reach the lower carbon scenario end-of-2025 GDP level about 1 day later. 
Part of the reason for the small GDP effect is that between 2018 and 2020 the low-carbon 
transition initially raises the average price of electricity (by about 1 percent) due to the hump-
shaped time profile of  the hydro / thermal cost differential (Figure 20) discussed above. A 
further reason is that the reduction in demand for domestic natural gas by the thermal sector 
leads to a small reduction in the primary resource extraction activity of the domestic fossil fuel 
sector. In economic terms this means a reduction in the supply of a primary production factor 
which entails per se a negative effect on real GDP. However, this effect is likewise tiny: The 
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2025 supply of domestic fossil fuel primary resources drops by 1.8 percent, while the baseline 
contribution of this factor to GDP is about 2 percent – so the effect on real GDP is well below 
0.05 percent. 
 
Figure 22: Impact on Real Export Volumes by Commodity Group – Lower Carbon 
Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
Figure 23: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – Baseline and Low Carbon Scenario 
(in Percent) 
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Finally, Figures 24 and 25 report the effects on the functional distribution of income and real 
factor income by household type for 2020 and 2025. Unsurprisingly, the impacts are again tiny. 
Like in the case of Kenya, the distribution impact is slightly regressive in tendency as by 2025 
capital and skilled labour gain slightly in relation to other factors. As explained earlier in 
section 4.3., this indicates that on average the sectors with higher growth than in the baseline 
tend to be more capital- and /or skill-intensive than sectors subject to a growth decline. The 
drop in agricultural land returns relative to the baseline scenario is due to the slight growth 
slowdown of the agricultural sector as agricultural imports rise and agricultural export growth 
declines marginally in response to the real appreciation. 
 
Figure 24: Impact on Factor Returns – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation of factor prices relative to CPI from baseline level 2020 and 2025) 
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Figure 25: Impact on Real Household Income – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation from Baseline level 2020 and 2025)  
 
 
 
5.4. High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 
The high fossil fuel price scenario under baseline assumptions about the power mix considered 
here provides the relevant reference scenario for comparison with the high-fossil-fuel-price 
(HFFP) lower carbon scenario presented in the following section. In contrast to the baseline 
scenario, crude oil and refined petrol world prices are assumed to return to higher levels beyond 
2016. As in the HFFP scenario for Kenya (section 4.3), between 2016 and 2018 oil prices rise 
linearly to a level that is 62 percent higher than the 2018 baseline price (Table 8) and then 
remain at that higher level beyond 2018, i.e. the oil price index with base 2011 rises to 0.81 by 
2018 compared to 0.50 in the baseline scenario. The natural gas import price index is assumed 
to stay permanently at the 2016 baseline scenario level of 0.83, and is thus 89 percent higher 
than the corresponding baseline level (0.44) over the period 2017 to 2025. Given that the 
purpose of this study is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of the sensitivity of Ghana’s 
economy to oil price shocks, the exposition of this reference scenario is brief and focuses on 
key differences to the baseline scenario. 
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Figure 26: Impact on Domestic Producer Prices – High Fossil Fuel Price Scenario 2025 
(Percentage deviation of price relative to unskilled wage from 2025 baseline) 
 
 
Figure 26 displays the effects on domestic supply prices in 2025 relative to the baseline. The 
world market crude oil price increase incentivizes a marked rise in Ghana’ crude oil export 
supply and the domestic fossil fuel extraction sector expands vis-a-à-vis the baseline. Due to 
the large thermal share in total electricity generation by 2025, the cost-push effect on the price 
of electricity is strong, and as a result the annual average growth rate of the electricity sector 
over the period 2015 to 2025 drops from 12.4 to 8.6 percent. The supply prices of non-energy 
sectors with relatively high energy cost (direct fuel plus electricity) shares in total production 
costs including the chemical industry, heavy and light manufacturing, other mining and 
transport services are likewise pushed up significantly and the growth  of these sectors slows 
down accordingly. 
In the baseline scenario Ghana remains a marginal net fossil fuel importer despite its crude oil 
exports, and thus the rise in international fossil fuel prices is an adverse terms-of-trade shock 
for the country. However, due to the additional crude oil export revenue growth in the HFFP 
scenario, the absolute size of the annual net fossil fuel import bill relative to the baseline 
scenario becomes smaller over time, and thus towards 2025 Ghana needs to earn less non-fuel 
export revenue than in the baseline to pay for the net fossil fuel import bill. This is a noteworthy 
difference to the HFFP scenario for Kenya discussed in section 4.4. 
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Figures 27 and 28 show the effects on GDP growth. As in the case of Kenya, GDP growth rates 
are hit strongly by the initially by the higher energy costs and then start to recover as 
international oil prices settle at the new higher level and the economy adapts to the shock. In 
contrast to Kenya, however, from 2023 onwards GDP growth rates start to overshoot the 
baseline rates. The reason for this effect is that the expansion of the domestic fossil fuel sector 
is associated with a higher rate of domestic natural resource extraction than in the baseline. By 
2023 the impact of this increase in the supply of a primary production factor on total economy-
wide value added is sufficiently strong to dominate the growth-depressing effects of higher 
energy prices on the annual growth rate. 
However, as shown in Figure 28, this effect is not strong enough to push the level of GDP 
above the baseline path: By 2021 real GDP is 4.0 percent below base and by 2025 still 3.2 
percent below base. 
Finally, for the interpretation of the results of the HFFP Lower Carbon scenario considered in 
the following section it is important to note that the hump-shaped time profile of the hydro-
thermal cost-differential (Figure 20) does of course not occur in the HFFP scenarios: Since 
fossil fuel prices remain high over the entire 2015-2025 period, the hydro/thermal unit cost 
ratio remains below unity throughout. 
 
Figure 27: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – Baseline and High Oil Price Scenario 
(in Percent) 
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Figure 28: Level of Real GDP 2015 to 2025 - Baseline and High Oil Price Scenario 
(Index, 2015 = 1.0) 
 
 
 
5.5. HFFP Lower Carbon Scenario  
Higher fossil fuel prices increase the cost advantage of hydro vis-à-vis thermal power 
generation, and so the impact of the transition towards a higher hydro share entails a stronger 
reduction of the electricity than in the low carbon scenario of section 5.3: By 2025 the 
electricity price is 6.2 percent lower than in the HFFP reference scenario, whereas in the low 
carbon scenario with low fossil fuel prices, the electricity price impact is only -1.1 percent. 
Moreover, since in contrast to the previous low carbon scenario the hydro cost advantage now 
prevails over the entire 2018-25 period, the gradual downward shift in electricity prices begins 
right at the start of the transition process in 2018, whereas in the low carbon scenario with low 
fossil fuel prices the same transition entails an initial electricity price increase due to the hump-
shaped time profile of the hydro-thermal cost differential (Figure 20). Correspondingly, the 
initial impact on the growth rate of real GDP turns from marginally negative (-0.01 percentage 
points in 2018, Figure 23) in the low carbon scenario to marginally positive (+0.03 percentage 
points in 2018, Figure 29).  
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Figure 29: Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP – High Fossil Fuel Price Lower Carbon 
Scenario 
(in Percent) 
 
 
 
However, the reduction in demand for domestic natural gas by the thermal sector and the real 
appreciation effect due to the reduced net fossil fuel import bill discussed in section 5.3 again 
lead to a small reduction in the primary resource extraction activity of the domestic fossil fuel 
sector. As explained earlier, this effect entails per se a negative impact on real GDP. By 2022 
this effect begins to slightly dominate the growth-enhancing effect of lower electricity prices 
(Figure 29). The cumulative impact of these miniscule effects on annual GDP growth rates 
remains small: By 2020, the level of real GDP in the HFFP low carbon scenario is 0.06 percent 
higher and by 2020 0.11 percent lower than in the HFFP reference scenario. 
Thus, in contrast to the corresponding analysis for Kenya, the quantitative impact of the lower-
carbon transition in the electricity sector on macroeconomic growth in Ghana is not particularly 
sensitive to variations in the assumptions about international fossil fuel prices: Both, in the low 
carbon scenario and the HFFP low carbon scenario the impacts on real GDP remain negligibly 
small despite the qualitative differences across the two scenarios. Also in contrast to the 
findings for Kenya, higher fossil fuel prices do not enlarge but rather reduce the beneficial 
impacts of a transition from thermal to lower-cost renewable electricity generation in the case 
of Ghana. As elaborated above, the main reason for these differences is related to the 
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endogenous changes in domestic fossil fuel resource extraction that occur in the case of Ghana 
but not in the case of Kenya. 
 
Figure 30: Impact on Factor Returns – Low Carbon Scenario 
(Percentage deviation of factor prices relative to CPI from baseline level 2020 and 2025) 
  
 
As shown in Figure 30, impacts on the functional distribution of income remain small. As in 
the lower carbon scenario of section 3, the drop in returns to land relative to the reference 
scenario is due to a slight decline of the growth rate of the agricultural sector as a result of the 
real exchange rate appreciation effect: The 2025 gross output this sector is 0.37 percent lower 
than in the reference scenario, which is equivalent to a drop in the average annual growth rate 
over the period 2015-2025 on the order of -0.04 percentage point. The slight drop in average 
real returns to capital by 2025 relative to the reference scenario is primarily driven by the slower 
growth of the relatively capital-intensive fossil fuel extraction section. In the HFFP reference 
scenario this sector is larger than in the baseline scenario and thus its growth slow-down has a 
stronger adverse effect on capital returns and natural resource rents in the HFFP low carbon 
scenario than in the low carbon scenario of section 5.3. 
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6. Conclusions 
The present study applies purpose-built dynamic computable general equilibrium models for 
Ghana and Kenya with a disaggregated country-specific representation of the power sector to 
simulate the prospective medium-run growth and distributional implications associated with a 
shift towards a higher share of renewables in the power mix up to 2025. 
In both countries the share of fossil-fuel-based thermal electricity generation in the power mix 
will increase sharply over the next decade and beyond according to current national energy 
sector development plans. 
Kenya has a considerable potential for a further expansion of geothermal electricity generation 
and existing estimates suggest a significant cost advantage of geothermal over thermal power 
generation. In line with this assessment, the simulation analysis for Kenya considers a stylised 
low-carbon transition scenario in which the geothermal share in total domestic on-grid 
electricity generation increases along a steep linear schedule to reach 75 percent in 2025, so 
that the 2025 geothermal share is about 24 percentage points higher than in the baseline 
scenario. 
The higher of share of low-cost geothermal in the power mix reduces electricity prices and 
mildly stimulates economic growth. The associated reduction in the fossil fuel import bill 
triggers a moderate real exchange rate appreciation, which reduces the prices of imports faced 
by domestic producers and households and entails a further economy-wide real income gain. 
The size of these beneficial aggregate effects depends on the evolution of international fossil 
fuel prices over the simulation horizon: Under a low-carbon transition scenario with low world 
market fossil fuel prices, real GDP in 2025 is about 1.1 percent higher than in the baseline 
scenario. In a low-carbon scenario with high fossil fuel import price scenario, real GDP in 2025 
is more than 2 percent higher than in the corresponding high-fossil-fuel-price baseline scenario. 
All household groups gain, but urban and rural higher-income households gain relatively more 
than urban and rural low-income households, because skilled real wages and real returns to 
capital rise slightly more than unskilled wages and returns to land. Impacts on the sectoral 
structure of production are generally small. In tendency, sectors with a higher baseline share of 
electricity costs in total production cost expand relative to sectors with a low electricity cost 
share. 
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In comparison to Kenya, Ghana’s potential for an economically viable expansion of renewable 
on-grid power generation is considerably smaller. Moreover, in contrast to Kenya Ghana has 
an already active domestic fossil fuel extraction sector and is planning to satisfy a significant 
share of the fuel demand of its expanding gas-fired thermal generation using domestic natural 
gas resources. The available levelised cost estimates suggest that in the case of Ghana presently 
hydro is the only renewable energy option with a clear cost advantage over gas-fired thermal 
generation, yet the potential for a further expansion of hydro capacity is limited. In line with 
this assessment, the simulation analysis for Ghana considers a moderate lower-carbon 
transition scenario in which the hydro share in total generation by 2025 is 7 percentage-points 
higher than in the baseline scenario and the 2025 thermal share drops from 83 to 76 percent. 
This moderate electricity sector transition shock generates only marginal impacts on 
macroeconomic growth: The effect on real GDP in 2025 ranges from +0.2 percent under low 
world market fossil fuel prices to -0.1 percent under high international fossil fuel prices. The 
presence of a domestic fossil fuel extraction sector in Ghana changes the qualitative nature of 
the dynamic adjustment to the transition shock in relation to the case of Kenya. As in the 
analysis for Kenya, the partial shift to lower-cost renewable power generation reduces the cost 
electricity and this per se stimulates economic growth. However, the associated drop in demand 
for domestic natural gas by the electricity sector slightly dampens the growth of domestic 
natural resource extraction, and this reduction in primary factor supply growth per se reduces 
real GDP growth. Thus, in the case of Ghana these two effects drag GDP in opposite directions 
and the net effect is miniscule. Similar to Kenya, the impacts on the sectoral structure of 
domestic production are small and thus the effects on relative factor prices that determine the 
functional income distribution remain unremarkable. 
The overarching general message suggested by the simulation results presented here is that in 
both countries it appears feasible to reduce the carbon content of electricity generation 
significantly without adverse consequences for economic growth and without noteworthy 
distributional effects. 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
References and Background Sources 
Aguiar, A., B. Narayanan and R. McDougall (2016) An Overview of the GTAP 9 Data 
Base. Journal of Global Economic Analysis 1(1), 181-208. 
Arndt, C., S. Robinson, and D Willenbockel (2011) Ethiopia’s Growth Prospects in a Changing 
Climate: A Stochastic General Equilibrium Approach. Global Environmental Change 21, 701–
10. 
Bazilian, M. et al (2012) Energy Access Scenarios to 2030 for the Power Sector in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Utilities Policy 20, 1-16.  
Bhattacharyya, S. C. (1996) Applied General Equilibrium Models for Energy Studies: A 
Survey. Energy Economics 18(3), 145–164. 
Bibas, R. and A. Mejean (2012) Negative Emissions and Ambitious Climate Policies in a 
Second Best World: A General Equilibrium Assessment of Technology Options in the 
Electricity Sector. International Conference on Economic Modeling- EcoMod 2012, Seville 
Böhringer, C. and A. Löschel (2004) A Computable General Equilibrium Model for Climate 
and Trade Policy Analysis. C. Böhringer and A. Löschel (eds) Climate Change Policy and 
Global Trade. Heidelberg and New York: Physica-Verlag (Springer), 111-144. 
Böhringer, C. and A. Löschel (2006) Promoting Renewable Energy in Europe. The Energy 
Journal 27(SI2), 136-150. 
Böhringer, C. and T.F. Rutherford (2013) Transition towards a Low Carbon Economy: A 
Computable General Equilibrium Analysis for Poland. Energy Policy 55, 16-26. 
Böhringer, C. and T.F. Rutherford (2008) Combining Bottom-Up and Top-Down. Energy 
Economics 30, 574-596. 
Böhringer, C., A. Löschel and T.F. Rutherford (2009) Policy Analysis Based on Computable 
General Equilibrium (PACE). V. Bosetti, R.Gerlagh, S.P. Schleicher (eds) Modelling 
Sustainable Development: Transitions to a Sustainable Future. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
202-220. 
Boeters, S. and J. Koornneef (2011) Supply of Renewable Energy Sources and the Cost of 
EU Climate Policy. Energy Economics 33, 1024-1034. 
Breisinger, C., J. Thurlow and M. Duncan (eds) (2007) A 2005 Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) for Ghana. Ghana Statistical Service and International Food Policy Research Institute 
under the Ghana Strategy Support Program. 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2015) Levelised Cost of Electricity: DFID Priority 
Countries. November. 
Capros, P., D. van Regemorter, L. Paroussos and P. Karkatsoulis (2013) GEM-E3 Model 
Documentation. JRC Technical Reports. Seville: Institute for Prospective Technological 
Studies. 
Dervis, K., de Melo, J. and Robinson, S. (1982) General Equilibrium Models for Development 
Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
EnCG (2016) National Energy Statistics 2006-2015. Accra: Energy Commission of Ghana. 
April. 
64 
 
EnCG (2006) Strategic National Energy Plan 2006-2020. Energy Commission, Ghana. July. 
Fortes, P., S. Simões, J. Seixas, D. van Regemorter and F. Ferreira (2013) Top-Down and 
Bottom-Up Modelling to Support Low-Carbon Scenarios: Climate Policy Implications. 
Climate Policy 13(3), 285-304. 
Gakuru, R. and N. Matheng (2012) Poverty, Growth, and Income Distribution in Kenya: A 
SAM Perspective. AGRODEP Working Paper No.0001. 
Government of Kenya (2013) Second Medium Term Plan, 2013 – 2017 
Government of Kenya (2007) Kenya Vision 2030: A Globally Competitive and Prosperous 
Kenya. Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development / National Economic and 
Social Council. 
GSS (2015) Annual Gross Domestic Product. September 2015 Edition. Accra: Ghana 
Statistical Service. 
GSS (2014) Ghana Living Standards Survey Round 6 (GLSS 6): Main Report. Accra: Ghana 
Statistical Service. 
Hertel, T.W. and D. van der Mensbrugghe (2016) Behavioral Parameters. GTAP Resource 
#5138. https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=5138 . 
Hourcade, J.-C., M. Jaccard, C. Bataille and F. Ghersi (2006) Hybrid Modeling: New 
Answers to Old Challenges. The Energy Journal 27(SI2), 1-11. 
IRENA (2015) Ghana Renewables Readiness Assessment. Abu Dhabi: International 
Renewable Energy Agency. 
Kemfert, C. and T. Truong (2009) Energy-Economy-Environment Modelling: A Survey. J. 
Evans and L.C. Hunt (eds) International Handbook on the Economics of Energy. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 367-382.  
Kenya Engineer (2016) Court stalls coal mining at Mui basin. Kenya Engineer, 28 May 2016. 
(http://www.kenyaengineer.co.ke/2016-05-28-20-43-28/latest-news/item/1253-court-stalls-
coal-mining-at-mui-basin ), accessed January 2017. 
KIPPRA (2016) Kenya Economic Report 2016. Nairobi: Kenya Institute for Public Policy 
Research and Analysis. 
Kiringai, J., B. Wanjala, N. Waiyaki, C. Mutunga, G. Njenga, J. Mutua and N. Nafula (2007) 
A 2003 Social Accounting Matrix for Kenya: Methodological Note. KIPPRA Discussion Paper 
No.72. 
Kiringai, J., J. Thurlow and B. Wanjala (2006) A 2003 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for 
Kenya. Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis and International Food Policy 
Research Institute. 
KNBS (2016a) Economic Survey 2016. Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 
KNBS (2016b) Statistical Abstract 2016. Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. 
Lanz, B. and S. Rausch (2011) General Equilibrium, Electricity Generation Technologies and 
the Cost of Carbon Abatement: A Structural Sensitivity Analysis. Energy Economics 33, 1035-
1047. 
65 
 
Lehr, U., C. Lutz, D. Edler, M. O’Sullivan, K. Nienhaus, J. Nitsch, B. Breitschopf, P. Bickel 
and M. Ottmüller (2011)   Kurz- und langfristige Auswirkungen des Ausbaus der erneuerbaren 
Energien auf den deutschen Arbeitsmarkt. Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für 
Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit. Osnabrück: GWS. 
Lofgren, H., R.L. Harris, S. Robinson with M. Thomas and M. El-Said (2002) A Standard 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model in GAMS. Microcomputers in Policy 
Research 5. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.  
McFarland, J.R., J.M. Reilly and H.J. Herzog (2004) Representing Energy Technologies in 
Top-Down Economic Models Using Bottom-Up Information. Energy Economics 26, 685-707. 
Ministry of Energy (2010) Energy Sector Strategy and Development Plan. Republic of Ghana. 
February. 
Okagawa, A., T. Masui, O. Akashi, Y. Hijioka, K. Matsumoto and M. Kainuma (2012) 
Assessment of GHG Emission Reduction Pathways in a Society without Carbon Capture and 
Nuclear Technologies. Energy Economics 34, 5391-5398. 
Otuki, N. (2016) Ministry drops plans for 700MW gas power plant. Business Daily, 28 April 
2016. 
Peters, J.C. (2016) The GTAP-Power Data Base: Disaggregating the Electricity Sector in the 
GTAP Data Base. Journal of Global Economic Analysis 1(1), 209-250. 
Peters, J.C., and T.W. Hertel (2016a) Matrix Balancing with Unknown Total Costs: Preserving 
Economic Relationships in the Electric Power Sector. Economic Systems Research 28(1), 1–
20. 
Peters, J.C., and T.W. Hertel (2016b) The Database-Modeling Nexus in Integrated Assessment 
Modeling of Electric Power Generation.” Energy Economics, 56, 107–116. 
Praxides, C. (2016) Lamu Sh200bn coal-fired plant permit revoked. The Star, Kenya, 11 
November 2016. 
Proenca, S. and M. St. Aubyn (2013) Hybrid Modeling to Support Energy-Climate Policy: 
Effects of Feed-in Tariffs to Promote Renewable Energy in Portugal. Energy Economics 38(C), 
176-185. 
Pueyo, A. and S. Spratt with S. Bawakyillenuo and H. Osiolo (2017) Green Investment 
Diagnostics for Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Kenya and Ghana. (Draft 12.1.17) 
Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
Pueyo, A., S. Bawakyillenuo and H. Osiolo (2016) Cost and Returns of Renewable Energy in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparison of Kenya and Ghana. IDS Evidence Report No. 190. 
Pueyo, A., S. Spratt, H. Schmitz, D. Willenbockel, C. Dent, N. Wade and A. Crossland (2015) 
Green Growth Diagnostics for Africa: Literature Review and Scoping Study. IDS Working 
Paper No. 455.  
Republic of Ghana (2015a) Gas Master Plan. Ministry of Petroleum. December. 
Republic of Ghana (2015b) Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) in Ghana 
Investment Plan.  
 
66 
 
Republic of Kenya (2014) 10 Year Power Sector Expansion Plan 2014-2024. June. 
Republic of Kenya (2013a) Kenya Vision 2030 Second Medium Term Plan, 2013-2017. 
Transforming Kenya: Pathway to Devolution, Socio-Economic Development, Equity and 
National Unity. Nairobi: Ministry of Devolution and Planning. 
Republic of Kenya (2013b) Updated Least Cost Power Development Plan Study Period: 2013-
2033. March. 
Republic of Kenya (2011) Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) Investment Plan 
for Kenya. May. 
Robinson, S., D. Willenbockel and K. Strzepek (2012) A Dynamic General Equilibrium 
Analysis of Adaptation to Climate Change in Ethiopia. Review of Development Economics 
16(3), 489–502. 
Robinson, S., A. Yunez-Naude, R. Hinojosa-Ojeda, J.D. Lewis and S. Devarajan (1999) From 
Stylized to Applied Models: Building Multisectoral CGE Models for Policy Analysis. North 
American Journal of Economics and Finance 10, 5–38. 
Robinson, S., A. Cattaneo and M. El-Said (2001) Updating and Estimating a Social Accounting 
Matrix using Cross Entropy Methods.” Economic Systems Research 13(1), 47–64. 
Sassi, O., R. Crassous, J.-C. Hourcade, V. Gitz, H. Waisman and C. Guivarch (2010) Imaclim-
R: A Modelling Framework to Simulate Sustainable Development Pathways. International 
Journal of Global Environmental Issues 10, 5-24. 
Sue Wing, I. (2009) Computable General Equilibrium Models for the Analysis of Energy and 
Climate Policies. J. Evans and L.C. Hunt (eds) International Handbook on the Economics of 
Energy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 332-366. 
Sue Wing, I. (2008) The Synthesis of Bottom-up and Top-down Approaches to Climate Policy 
Modeling: Electric Power Technology Detail in a Social Accounting Framework. Energy 
Economics 30, 547-573. 
The Conference Board (2016) Total Economy Database™ - Growth Accounting and Total 
Factor Productivity, 1995-2015 (Adjusted version), November.  (https://www.conference-
board.org/data/economydatabase/index.cfm?id=27762) , accessed January 2017. 
UN DESA (2015) World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision. United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 
(https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/), accessed March 2016. 
UNU-WIDER (2017) World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.4). Helsinki: United Nations 
University World Institute for Development Economics Research 
Willenbockel, D. (2015) Reflections on the Prospects for Pro-Poor Low-Carbon Growth. L. 
Haddad, H. Kato and N. Meisel (eds) Growth is Dead, Long Live Growth: The Quality of 
Economic Growth and Why it Matters. Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency, 159-
185. 
Willenbockel, D. and H.C. Hoa (2011) Fossil Fuel Prices and Taxes: Effects on Economic 
Development and Income Distribution in Viet Nam. Background Report UNDP (2012) Fossil 
Fuel Fiscal Policies and GHG Emissions in Vietnam. 
67 
 
World Bank (2016) Global Economic Prospects: January 2016. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. 
World Bank (2013) Energizing Economic Growth in Ghana: Making the Power and Petroleum 
Sectors Rise to the Challenge. Energy Group Africa Region, June. 
World Bank (2008) Kenya Poverty and Inequality Assessment Volume I: Synthesis Report. 
Washington, DC: World Bank Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Africa 
Region Report No. 44190-KE.  
 
 
 
 
 
